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Introduction
As part of the Discovery Program's continuous improvement effort, a
Discovery Program Lessons-Learned workshop was designed to review how
well the Discovery Program is moving toward its goal of providing low-cost
research opportunities to the planetary science community while ensuring
continued U.S. leadership in solar system exploration. The principal focus of
the workshop was on the recently completed Announcement of Opportunity
(AO) cycle, but program direction and program management were also open
to comment. The objective of the workshop was to identify both the strengths
and weaknesses of the process up to this point, with the goal of improving the
process for the next AO cycle.
The process for initializing the workshop was to solicit comments from
the communities involved in the program and to use the feedback as the basis
for establishing the workshop agenda. By approaching the workshop in this
manner, we were able to focus the workshop on the areas of highest interest.
The workshop was designed to provide an opportunity for participants from
each of the constituent groups (academia, industry, and government organiza-
tions) to present their own lessons learned, followed by four working sessions
to consider issues relevant to each area and derive potential improvements to
the process. The following four sessions were developed after reviewing and
synthesizing both the formal feedback received and informal feedback ob-
tained during discussions with various participants: (1) Science and Return
on Investment; (2) Technology vs. Risk; Mission Success and Other Factors;
(3) Cost; (4) AO/AO Process Changes and Program Management.
The chair of the workshop was Dr. David Bohlin from the Office of Space
Science's Space Physics Division. Dr. Bohlin was the Chair of the Space
Science Steering Committee, which reviewed the initial Discovery AO pro-
cess to assure it was conducted properly. His previous experiences brought a
well-informed independent approach to the workshop. We were also fortu-
nate to have leading experts from each of the constituencies present their
lessons learned as part of the initial workshop activities. These presentations
were representative of the feedback received, positive and constructive, and
highlighted the areas of greatest interest. The presenters focused their views
on the areas that both enhanced their efforts to develop their proposals and
those that inhibited their work, with the intention of ensuring that positive
attributes were retained and the areas of concern were reviewed for improve-
ments. Headquarters also presented lessons learned. Copies of each workshop
presentation are included in this volume.
Following the presentations, workshop attendees separated into the four
splinter group sessions to address the issues identified for that group, priori-
tize them, and develop potential resolutions to the most important ones. Each
group was chaired by a representative from the communities represented who
served as the spokesperson for the group. The sessions were extremely
productive and drove straight to the heart of the issues. Crosscutting presen-
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tations were given in the morning on the second day, followed by further
splinter group meetings. At the end of the morning the session chairs pre-
sented their preliminary findings.
The splinter group's presentations identified the principle issues discussed,
potential solutions to the issues, and a number of alternative recommenda-
tions. These presentations revealed the interrelated issues among the different
groups that must be integrated and synthesized into a coherent approach for
them to be viable. To facilitate bringing the splinter group recommendations
to closure, the workshop participants concurred with the establishment of a
small steering group, composed of the four splinter group chairs plus several
other representatives, to continue the work initiated at the workshop. The
steering group was formed and assigned the task of completing their activities
by the end of summer. Dr. William Boynton from the University of Arizona
agreed to chair the steering group, and the membership included representa-
fives from each of the three principal constituencies: academia, industry, and
government organizations. The steering group was given the responsibility of
adjudicating most of the comments and recommendations identified during
the workshop and forming a complete integrated set of improvements for
NASA to consider. The conclusions of the steering group are included in this
report.
The activities of the Lessons-Learned workshop are having far-reaching
effects on the Discovery Program as well as other similar programs in NASA.
The issues, discussions, and preliminary recommendations of the workshop
are being used in the Explorer programs and in new programs such as the
Mission to Planet Earth's new program, Earth System Science Pathfinders.
As all these programs use the same foundation of experiences, individual
program implementation strategies are expected to converge, ultimately
making the task of proposing to each different AO a similar process.
The success of this workshop is a direct result of input from the commu-
nity, and the Office of Space Science wishes to thank all contributors to this
process.
Logistics and administrative and publications support for this workshop
were provided by the staff of the Lunar and Planetary Institute.
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Program
Wednesday, June 14, 1995
8:00 a.m. Introduction, Agenda Hampton Room
8:15 a.m. Program Status and Future Outlook
8:35 a.m. Science Community Perspectives
1. W. Boynton (Univ. of Arizona)
2. C. Russell (UCLA)
3. A. Binder (Lockheed/Martin)
9:45 a.m. Industry Perspectives
1. D. Roalstad (Ball Aerospace)
2. B. Clark (Lockheed/Martin)
3. G. Adams (Hughes)
4. J. Freitag (TRW)
5. D. Smith (Boeing)
6. D. Tenerelli (Lockheed/Martin)
7. D. Gump (LunaCorp)
1:00 p.m. Government / FFRDC Perspectives
1. S. Hubbard (ARC)
2. E. Davis (JPL)
3. L. Crawford (Applied Physics Lab)
2:00 p.m. Summary of Written Community Comments
NASA Headquarters Perspectives
2:45 p.m. Splinter Group Objectives and Assignments
3:30 p.m. Splinter Group Sessions
1. Science and Return on
Investments
2. Technology vs. Risk: Mission
Success and Other Factors
3. Cost
4. AO / AO Process Changes and
Program Management
Calvert Room
Embassy Room
Senate Room
Council Room
*CHARTER: Develop recommendations for next AO*
--David Bohlin
--Jurgen Rahe
--Mark Saunders
--Mark Saunders
--Mark Saunders
--William Boynton (Chair)
--David Roalstad (Chair)
--Lawrence Mitchler (Chair)
--Scott Hubbard (Chair)
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Thursday, June 15,1995
8:00 a.m. Splinter Group Sessions
1. Science and Return on Investments
2. Technology vs. Risk: Mission
Success and Other Factors
3. Cost
4. AO/AOO Process Changes and
Program Management
Calvert Room
Embassy Room
Senate Room
Council Room
--William Boynton (Chair)
---David Roalstad (Chair)
---Scott Hubbard (Chair)
--Lawrence Mitchler (Chair)
10:00 a.m. Plenary Session Splinter Group Reports
and Discussions Empire Room
12:00 p.m. Conclusions --David Bohlin,
Mark Saunders
12:30 p.m. Adjourn
LPI Technical Report 95-03 vii
Contents
Steering Group Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 1
Minutes of the DLLSG Meeting .......................................................................................................... 3
Annotated Cost Instructions ................................................................................................................ 7
Workshop Presentations
Science Community Perspectives ...................................................................................................... 13
Industry Perspectives ........................................................................................................................ 23
Government/FFRDC Perspectives .................................................................................................... 31
Summarized Written Community Comments .................................................................................... 39
NASA Headquarters Perspectives .................................................................................................... 41
Splinter Group Sessions .................................................................................................................... 45
List of Workshop Participants ........................................................................................................... 55

LPI Technical Report 95-03 1
Steering Group Recommendations
These recommendations of the Discovery Lessons-Learned
Steering Group follow from a meeting in Washington DC on
July 19 and a conference call on September 26. The member-
ship of the steering group is William Boynton (University of
Arizona, Lunar and Planetary Laboratory), Chair; Kevin
Baines (Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Mary Chiu (Johns Hopkins
University/Applied Physics Laboratory); Cynthia Faulconer
(Lockheed Martin); Scott Hubbard (NASA Ames Research
Center); Larry Mitchler (TRW Civil & International Systems
Division); David Roalstad (Ball Corporation, Electro-Opti-
cal Subsystems); and Christopher Russell (UCLA, Institute
of Geophysics & Planetary Physics).
ASSUMPTIONS
This section specifically does not contain the recommen-
dations of the group, though we may agree with them. It states
the ground rules of the environment in which we were work-
ing.
1. Though proposals could be grouped based on similar
cost and evaluated independent of cost within that group, at
some point low-cost proposals would have to compete with
high-cost proposals with cost being a significant discrimina-
tor.
2. The new AO process will be the final selection; it will
not select multiple proposals to be downselected later.
3. In the event the full $150M is not available, the AO will
state that it was targeted to proposals below a certain cost or
spending profile, but the AO will never target just high-cost
proposals (see rule number 1).
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The proposal evaluation process shall take two steps.
(a) The selection of successful proposals in the first step shall
be based mainly on cost and a detailed science evaluation
(including instrumentation). Information in the areas of tech-
nical approach and management shall also be evaluated to
determine feasibility of the project. (b) The first step is a
mandatory gate; only proposals selected by step 1 may be
submitted for step 2. (c) The formula to be used for evaluation
in step 1 shall be similar to the one used in step 2 as noted
below.
2. Though a mathematical formula is proposed for the
selection score, it is understood that the AA for Space Science
will be able to use discretion to adjust for programmatic or
other factors.
3. The formula for rating proposals following step 2 shall
be:
where
Score = ROI x POS
ROI = return on investment;
POS = probability of success;
ROI (0.8 × Science × Science Risk + 0.1 × PA + 0.1 × EO)
(Total Cost to NASA)
PA = public awareness;
EO = educational opportunity
The science, PA, and EO scores shall be normalized by
dividing all scores by the highest one in that category, i.e., the
scores will range from 0 to 1 in each of these categories. (See
recommendation 8 for details on applying science risk fac-
tors.)
Technology and small and small-disadvantaged business
contracting plans shall not be part of the evaluation criteria.
The Total Cost to NASA is the proposed cost for all phases,
A through E. It shall include direct costs, civil-servant costs,
and launch-vehicle costs. Independent cost estimates deter-
mined by the review process shall be used only for accessing
cost risk.
The probablility of success (POS) is determined by combin-
ing risk factors in the area of cost, technical approach, and
management. The POS should describe the probability that
the mission will succeed in meeting the cost and schedule
targets and that it will succeed in delivering and servicing the
science payload as required. (The probability that the science
will be achieved is contained in the Science Risk term and is
not considered here.) The individual risk factors are numbers
ranging from 0 to I, and they are to express the probability that
the factor will allow the ROI to be to be realized, e.g., a cost
risk factor of 0.98 indicates that there is little chance of a cost
overrun; a technical risk of 0.3 indicates that the technical
approach has serious flaws that make it unlikely that the
mission will succeed. It should be understood that the risks in
these areas are not independent, i.e., a poor management
approach would certainly contribute to a cost risk. The evalu-
ation process should combine all of these risks into the POS
term, the probability of achieving the ROI.
4. For the first step in the process, the formula shall be
modified such that PA, EO, and cost risk are not part of the
evaluation. In addition, the combined weight of management
risk and technical risk shall be reduced so that it cannot modify
the ROI by more than a factor of 2 and technical risk shall be
about twice as important as management risk. These criteria
can be satisfied by limiting the dynamic range of technical risk
to 0.4 (ranging from 0.6 to 1.0) and of management risk to 0.2
(from 0.8 to 1.0). Thus the formula for rating proposals follow-
ing step 1 shall be:
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Score = (Science x Science Risk) x (modified POS)
(Total Cost to NASA)
where
modified POS = (0.6 + Technical Risk x 0.4) x
(0.8 + Management Risk x 0.2)
5. The cost estimate in the step-one proposal should be
considered to be a good-faith estimate of what the step-two
proposal costs will be. Any growth between the fast and
second proposal shall have to be justified, and if not well
justified, will contribute to an assessment of additional cost
risk in evaluation of the step-two proposal. In no case may the
costs increase by more than 15% between the first and second
proposal. No form SF 1411 shall be required in the f'trst-step
evaluation.
6. The level of cost detail for step 2 shall be comparable
to that requested in the fast Discovery AO (see Table 1). The
form SF 1411 shall be required only for the fLrst phase to be
funded, normally phase A.
7. The cost detail for step 1 shall consist of only the three
exhibits required in the step-2 proposal.
8. The science evaluation shall not be based on simple
adjectival grades. It should be scored using the science objec-
tives listed in NASA and COMPLEX strategies as a guide.
The score should reflect the number of objectives addressed,
the importance of the objectives, and the thoroughness with
which the objectives are addressed or answered. Determining
the relative importance of different objectives may not always
be easy, but it is noted that COMPLEX has consistently
recommended a strategy of reconnaissance, followed by ex-
ploration, followed by intensive study with progressively
greater science return from the more detailed investigations.
The idea is that the later missions can build on the results of
the earlier missions and retum much higher science, but only
if the groundwork is laid such that the more detailed mission
can be designed to answer well-posed questions. Within these
three categories, the COMPLEX and NASA strategies often
ascribe priorities to different objects in the solar system, and
to different objectives for a given object. These strategies can
only be considered guides, and substantial discretion will
need to be left to the scientific review panel. For example,
because these documents may become dated based on U.S. or
foreign missions that started after the documents were pub-
lished, the panel can significantly reduce the importance of
highly rated science that can be reasonably expect to be
provided by another currently approved mission.
This score can be open ended in the sense that the more
objectives satisfied, the higher the score. If one mission
addresses twice as many objectives as another and they are
addressed as well and are of equal importance, then that
mission should score twice as high as the other mission.
The science risk reflects the probability that the science
generated by the mission will ultimately be the science pro-
posed. This risk should be assessed independent of the risks
in the POS (discussed in recommendation #3). It should
include risks associated with the instrumentation, the ability
of the measurements to address the proposed science, the
quality of the data management and archiving plan, and the
quality of the science team. In order to permit the addition of
one or more high-risk objectives to a mission, the science risk
should be assessed and applied separately for each objective.
For example, if a mission is proposed to an object that ad-
dresses two objectives very well and a third will only be
addressed if some high-risk approach works, its science rank-
ing would be higher than a similar mission that only proposed
the same two objectives that could be achieved with little risk.
(It should be noted, however, that if the reviewers determin-
ing the POS found that too much of management's attention
was focused on the third objective, the overall rating could be
lower.)
9. A suggested guideline for the AO schedule is:
o_o Step-I proposals due 3 months after AO
o_o Step-I results announced 2 months after due date
o.'o Step-2 proposals due 2 months after results announced
o.'° Final selection 3 months after step-2 due date
TABLE 1. Suggested step-two Discovery
cost proposal contents.
Exhibits
1. Total program cost elements by phase by FY. (I)
2. Major tasks, total payload, and total spacecraft cost
elements by phase by FY.
3. Flight subsystems (one level below total spacecraft)
and instruments (one level below total payload) cost
elements by phase by FY.
Supporting Data
1. Basis of estimates for exhibits 2 and 3. (2)
2. Major subcontractor data summary. (3)
3. Direct rates. (4)
4. Indirect rates. (5)
5. Other supporting data. (6)
Notes:
(1) Cost elements are labor hours, labor dollars, related payroll
expenses, overhead, other direct costs, materials and material
burden, major subcontracts, other subcontracts, general and ad-
ministrative, and ICOM.
(2) The SOW defines the work/products to be provided for the
CBS cell. Describe the method used to estimate the labor hours
and cost, materials, and subcontracts. For hardware, include an
equipment list for items greater than $1000 in value defining the
major components and sources and necessary cost detail.
(3) Subcontractor summary includes task, identity, type, location,
amount, contract type, adjustments and burdens.
(4) Direct rates by FY.
(5) Indirect rates by FY.
(6) Data necessary to evaluate proposal not provided elsewhere;
such as conversions, escalation methods, cost centers, etc.
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Minutes of the DLLSG Meeting
Attendees: William Boynton, David Roatstad, Larry
Mitchler, Scott Hubbard, Cindy Faulconer, Mary Chiu, Mark
Saunders
General background information was provided by Mark
Saunders on the current NASA environment and on recent
feedback on the Discovery Program provided by D. Goldin,
A. Diaz, and W. Huntress. While these comments are not
included in this summary, the overwhelming theme was that
the Discovery Program was to emphasize low cost--a $150M
program proposal would have to be EXCEPTIONAL. In
addition, there would be no science "targeting" of proposals.
Competition would be open to all disciplines, with both
inherently less expensive science competing directly with
inherently more expensive science.
M. Saunders stated that the following will be in the next
proposal request: Statement of Work for each Phase and
Incentive Plan. The Discovery Program may not have $150M
available for each Announcement of Opportunity (AO).
Saunders has stated that he would put in the amount available
for each AO in the future, i.e., if only $75M is available, this
will be stated up front in the AO along with a phasing of the
funding.
W. Boynton suggested that the group initially plan to
discuss three major topics: (1) Costs, what information (i.e.,
level of detail) is needed for proposal. (2) ROI equation
(Return on Investment). (3) AO process (key point--one- or
two-step process).
It quickly became clear that these three major topics are all
interrelated and the discussions would have to iterate through
these topics rather than make stand-alone decisions within
these areas. The following summarizes the steering group
meeting discussions in these three categories as well as
conclusions about the Opportunity activities.
The group agreed that September 21 is the goal for com-
pleting the DLLSG activities.
AO PROCESS
A key decision was made fairly early was that the AO
process would complete the competition phase. (In the first
AO process there was a competitive phase A--this would not
be the case in the next AO.) This decision was made to some
degree based on W. Huntress' desire not to have another
phase A competitive downselection, and was supported by
the DLLSG. The rationale was that everyone wanted a defi-
nite decision made that would allow the winner to go forward
and the nonwinners to move on to the next opportunity.
Eliminate lingering lower-level effort, which tends to be
inefficient and nonproductive.
The question of targeting the AO to a specific area was
considered. The consensus was that if NASA determines in
advance that there are reasons to do so, they should so state
the areas of emphasis in the AO, but that the emphasis should
not be exclusionary. The ability of the selection officer to
exercise discretion when a clear case could be made was
thought to be able to deal with most situations.
The group agreed that NASA needs to be as blunt as
possible about available budgets and the desired type of
mission, and should provide quantitative evaluation criteria
so that industry does not waste valuable resources preparing
proposals that will not get selected.
One-Step or Two-Step Process: The group concurred
on the following overall goals of any change to the AO
process: (1) Encourage growth, more participation (more
proposals).(2) Lower life cycle costs.(3) Get"best" proposals
possible. (4) Timeliness should also be considered.
Without defining the details of a two-step process, argu-
ments could be (and were) made that #2 and #3 could be
achieved by either a one- or two-step process. However, all
agreed that given the decision that the AO process would
decide the winner, only a two-step process would allow #1
above. Since the AO process ends the competition, enough
information has to be given in the proposal to go directly to
a contract. By definition then, the cost information, plans,
statement of work, and so on must be detailed. Detail infor-
mation drives up the cost of proposing, which can reduce the
number of proposers (i.e., limited to those who can afford to
spend large amounts of internal funds for B&P).
There were arguments that life-cycle costs could be re-
duced by either a one-step or a two-step process. It is true that
if the two-step is not defined in such a way that the first step
of the two-step process is at a significantly reduced cost, then
lower life-cycle costs may not be achieved. (While not stated
explicitly during the discussions, it is assumed here that the
information content of the two-step process must be the same
as that of the one-step process. The challenge is to define the
minimum content needed for the first step of the two-step
process.)
As an aside, with reflecting upon this later, there are some
simple ways to test lower life-cycle costs. They rely on many
assumptions, which can result in many scenarios. Three
sample scenarios are given in the attached appendix.
While there are an infinite number of scenarios that can be
imagined, the ones in the appendix illustrate a key point: A
two-step process, even one with a relatively expensive first
step (half of expected one-step process cost), reduces total
life-cycle costs to the proposers as long as the total number of
proposers stays constant. The most likely way a one-step
process reduces the life-cycle costs is by reducing the number
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of proposers--an exclusionary measure that is directly counter
to promoting growth and participation of the overall commu-
nity.
It is still a valid point that a grossly ill-defined two-step
process could result in increased life-cycle costs (to proposers
as a group). The information content of the fast step has to be
reduced to decrease the cost of preparation--the minimum
goal should be to reduce the fast step of a two-step process to
one-half of a one-step proposal.
A decision was made to use a two-step process (contingent
on not defining a overly costly first step of the two-step
process).
The group felt that the number of missions to proceed to
step 2 should be in the range of six or seven missions. The
group, however, also recommended that reason and logic be
used. In other words, if five are closely spaced in the evalu-
ation with all others way behind, then go with five. If eight are
closely spaced, etc., you may want to go with eight. The idea
was to keep the number of step-2 proposals large enough to
ensure that interesting and implementable missions make it
through but not too large that the AO LCC is big.
Contents of First and Second Steps: The definition of
the contents of the fast and second steps of the two-step
process did not progress to final conclusions, but general
agreement was reached on the basic contents. Three basic
options were considered in the beginning for the fast step: (1)
Science only evaluation. (2) Science and technical approach
evaluation (no cost or management). (3) Mini proposal.
While not fully discussed for definite decision, the general
consensus seemed to be that the first step would be to
downselect, not just rank proposals. It also seemed to be
general consensus that a mini-proposal with emphasis on the
science was the best, and a full science peer review panel was
required to evaluate step-one proposals. However, there still
needs to be a mechanism to ensure that the mission would not
be more costly than presented. This meant that step one needs
to include some level of detail on mission implementation
and design in order to determine if the science mission was
feasible and do-able. This generally requires the PFindustry/
center teams to be formed and presented in step one. Based on
these conclusions, there was a general consensus that the
same evaluation criteria should be used for both steps one and
twO.
Bogeys were selected for page count of the step one pro-
posal for each of the major topics as follows:
•:. Science including instrumentation, 25 pages
•:." Technical Approach including mission design, 10 pages
•:. Cost information, 5 pages
•_- Management Plan, 5 pages
The recommendation for the step-two proposal focused on
a proposal content similar to the original AO, particularly
since the outcome would be a mission selected for flight. This
proposal, though, would build on the step-one proposal,
particularly in the Science criteria. The content of the pro-
posal might be as follows:
o:- Full up proposal with only changes to science (maybe
100 pages)
o:- More detail on implementation and design, manage-
ment, and cost
o:° Smaller science panel to evaluate
o:° Evaluation based on ROI formula (same as step-one
formula)
o:° Orals and questions as part of step-two evaluation (if
necessary)
°:° Proposals must show all deltas (changes) from step one
and step two. This is advised to avoid "buy-in" in step
one.
Timeliness: Some discussion took place on the time
needed for the two-step process. Following bogeys were dis-
cussed but not finalized:
o_° First-Step Responses 3 months after AO release
o_° First-Step Evaluation Completion 2 months after
responses due
o_o Second-Step Responses 2 months after downselect
o:- Second-Step Selection 3 months after responses due
°:° Total time from AO release to final selection 10 months
COST DETAIL
There was some discussion on the cost detail needed for
both the fast and second step of the two-step process. There
was general consensus that the cost detail for the ftrst step
should be limited to a budgetary estimate from the proposer
with backup information at the discretion of the proposer up
to five pages. Level of detail, e.g., WBS level, was not de-
cided. L. Mitchler was to provide some detailed suggestions
on the final cost detail needed through second step. Mitchler's
response is attached (see section on Annotated Cost Instruc-
tions).
There was some discussion on penalties if the cost estimate
provided for the second step was much greater than that of the
fast step. However, it was recognized that penalties were
difficult to define. A higher cost has a built-in penalty given
the ROI definition, which will be discussed below. However,
there seemed to be some concern that a proposer could "buy-
in" with a lower cost to get through the first step, and prevent
a more realistically costed proposal getting to the second step.
Blatant "low-ball" costs can most likely be flagged by review-
ers and this should not be a real problem. However,"optimis-
tic" costs vs. "pessimistic" costs may be difficult to distin-
guish given the fact that the first step is designed to contain
less detail using a proposer's budgetary estimate. By nature,
these estimates are probably only good to about 25%, and this
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must be recognized by the reviewers--that is, cost-risk evalu-
ation for the first step must be very coarse. Saunders stated
that it is probably best to downselect from the first step based
on the top competitive range, rather than have an absolute
maximum or minimum number to go to the second step.
Given a competitive range selection and a coarse cost-risk
criteria, an "optimistically" costed proposal could be within
the competitive range of a"pessimistically" costed proposal,
given that all other evaluation factors are the same. This
would depend in part on the coarse cost-risk criteria. In fact,
this might be a good litmus test for the coarse cost-risk criteria
development. Saunders stated that there could also be a
statement within the AO that allowed reviewers to down-
grade proposals that had significant increases in cost between
the first-step proposal and the second-step proposal. This
allows the reviewers some latitude for evaluating cost changes
between the two steps, while putting proposers on notice that
such changes must be explained and could be counted against
them. Realistically, with the ROI, any proposer with "opti-
mistic" costs in the first step would be weeded out with higher
costs in the second step given consistent science scores. Such
a proposer only incurs more internal cost without winning
final selection--not a sound business practice. This is a tough
problem, and there may not be a perfect solution.
While not discussed at any length, a proposer's past per-
formance should be given due consideration for the cost risk
assessment. A copy of the latest was provided to Saunders and
Mitchler.
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI)
Boynton handed out a write-up of the definition of the
ROI. There was general consensus that the ROI was a good
way to ensure that only proposals that were of high quality
across ALL categories would receive high scores and that
"ROI" should be the basis for evaluation in each step of the
AO process. (There was some perception stated at the work-
shop that a lower science score could be masked by higher
scores in other categories such as cost. This should not be the
case with a multiplicative scoring system.)
Boynton's proposal for Return on Investment was repre-
sented by the following formula:
ROI = (0.8 x Science Value x SciRisk + 0.1 x Ed + 0.1 x PA)
Total Cost to NASA
The definition of each of the above criteria is defined
below.
Science Value: Science value is to be determined pri-
marily by how well the proposed science objectives address
the priorities determined by the strategy of the National
Research Council (NRC) Committee on Planetary and Lunar
Exploration (COMPLEX) and NASA's strategic plans. The
score should reflect the breadth of the proposed investigation
(how many objectives are addressed), the depth of the inves-
tigation (how thoroughly the objectives are addressed), the
importance of the investigation (the priority of the objectives
that are addressed), and the quality to which the objectives are
addressed (the extent to which the proposed measurements
are sufficient to address the objectives).
Another more subjective factor to include is the antici-
pated impact that the investigation will have on the field. It
is suggested that the value for this factor be put on a linear
scale with a high-quality mission (such as Voyager or Apollo)
being 10 and a modest mission (such as Clementine) being 1.
This is not a scale from 1 to 10; missions could have values
greater than 10 or less than I.
In order to use these scores in the algorithm, it will need
to be normalized to unity. This can be accomplished by
dividing all scores by the score of the highest ranked mission.
The way cost should be entered into the equation was still
up for debate. One alternative was to have several (approxi-
mately three) bins of comparable cost, and once a mission was
in a particular bin, cost would no longer be a discriminator
against other missions in the same cost bin.
Science Risk (SciRisk): This term should be expressed
as something that approximates a probability (from zero to
one) and is determined primarily from instrumentation and
the quality of the science team.
Technology Infusion was discussed as it relates to the
science objectives and was agreed that technology infusion
should not be given a separate score. The rationale for this is
that the use of the new technology should already manifest
itself by increasing the science or reducing the risk and would
thus get into the score with an appropriate weight.
Ed and PA: These are Educational Program Activities
and Public Awareness and their evaluation scores would be
similar to the original AO.
FINAL EVALUATION SCORE
The final evaluation score should be a combination of ROI
and Mission Risks based on the following formula:
where:
Score - ROI x Risk
Risk - Management Risk x Cost Risk x
Technical Approach Risk
Like science risk, these three terms should be expressed on
a scale from zero to one and should be in the form of a
probability. These terms will describe the probability that the
criteria will cause the anticipated Return on Investment not
to be achieved.
This scoring system does factor in costs at the 50% level.
While this may not be what some parts of the community
wants to hear, it is consistent with the current realities of
NASA. And if the final algorithm to be used is provided inthe
AO, then everyone at least knows how the determination is
being made. It also uses an assessment of science "value" for
selection purposes, a theme that has always been associated
with the Discovery Program.
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OPPORTUNITY
The group agreed that the evaluation process must find a
way to balance the technology vs. risk issue so that proposals
are not up-checked for new technology/technology insertion
and down-checked for risk at the same time. As mentioned in
the ROI discussion, the group felt that technology should not
be a separate evaluation factor since technology infusion
would be driven by the science needs. Missions accomplish-
ing great science by using new technology would be rewarded
in their science grade. Risks associated with the new technol-
ogy would be considered in the technical approach evalua-
tion.
The group felt that technology transfer was a factor that
did not enhance the overall evaluation and should be elimi-
nated.
In general there was a consensus that that the SB/SDB
factor imposes solutions that may not be optimal or most cost
effective and the factor should also be eliminated.
The group also seemed to agree that the education and
public awareness factors should be evaluated independently
and included in the return on investment calculation.
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS, ISSUES,
AND CONCERNS
As noted in the text above, there were no final conclusions
drawn by the DLLSG. The group agreed that further work
would be done through telecons and e-mail until a final
overall consensus could be reached. The members agreed that
the next discussion should take place in mid August.
Several questions, issues, and concerns were expressed
that would need further consideration. These were:
oIo Does the two-step process really reduce the life cycle
cost of the AO?
oIo Will the two-step process take too long to implement?
o**-Will the two-step process let people through step one
that shouldn't get through? And will it inadvertently
shut out missions that really should progress to step
two?
°**-Should the evaluation formula be multiplicative or
additive? We discussed the idea that with "additive"
some missions can survive that have major holes (be-
cause they make up points in other areas).
APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF TOTAL COSTS FOR
ONE-STEP AND TWO-STEP AO PROCESSES
FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Below are some simplified calculations for evaluating
relative costs of the one- and two-step AO process. Others
may have different ways of viewing these.., any alternatives
would be interesting to discuss. I just used these to give me
some insight into the sensitivities of various factors.
Scenario 1: Assume number of proposers are the same
regardless of AO process--choose 28; assume that a
downselect occurs after the first step; choose 10 for second
step. Choose an average proposal cost of $1M. Assume that
the f'Lrst-step COStof the two-step process is half the cost of a
one-step process.
One-step process: Proposals cost $1M to each proposer,
total cost is 28 x $1M - $28M.
Two-stepprocess: First step cost $0.5M to each proposer,
Vast-step cost is 28 x $0.5M = $14M. Second-step cost is
$0.5M to each proposer, l0 x $0.5M - $5M. Total cost for
two-step - $19M.
Total costs to proposers as a group are lower in this
scenario for two-step.
Scenario 2: Assume number of proposers are differ-
ent--that number of proposers willing to risk $1M in the
beginning is subset of 28---choose ! 4. Other assumptions the
same as Scenario 1.
One-step process: Proposals cost $1M each, total cost is
14 x $1M - $14M.
Two-stepprocess: First-step cost is $0.5M each, cost is 28
x $0.5M - $14M. Second-step cost is $0.5M each, cost is 10
x $0.5M - $5M. Total cost for two-step is $19M.
Total costs to proposers as a group are lower for the one-
step process, but this is achieved only by the reduced number
of proposers willing to "risk" the higher costs--a smaller
"group." This is an exclusionary scenario that directly coun-
teracts one of the goals of the AO process, which is to promote
growth and participation.
Scenario 3: Same as Scenario 1 but with an increase in
cost for the second step of proposal. Assume number of
proposers are the same regardless of AO process--choose 28;
assume that a downselect occurs after first step; choose 10 for
second step.
One-step process: Proposals cost $1M to each proposer,
total cost is 28 x $1M = $2gM.
Two-step process: First-step cost is $0.5M to each
proposer, fast-step cost is 28 x $0.5M = $14M. Second-step
cost is $0.75M to each proposer, 10 x $0.75M -- $7.5M.
Total = $21.5M.
Again, total costs to proposers as a group is less for the two-
step process. However, it illustrates a very possible scenario
in which the downselect winners incur more individual costs
in a two-step process vs. a one-step. However, the increased
costs per individual proposers are not necessarily mandatory
and are somewhat under the proposer's control.
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Annotated Cost Instructions
This copy of the Discovery AO cost instructions is
annotated with questions and suggestions. In our opin-
ion, the instructions are generally straightforward and
appropriate for the second step of the next Discovery
Program competition. We have made suggestions where
we thought it would reduce the proposer's efforts or ease
the evaluation process while still providing adequate
data for evaluation.
II. COST PLAN
The cost plan should provide information on the antici-
pated costs for all phases of the mission. It should also
describe the plans for tracking and controlling costs, or
reference the applicable portions of Volume II or the Manage-
ment Approach section.
The inflation index provided in Appendix E should be
used to calculate all real-year dollar amounts, unless an
industry forward pricing rate is used. If something other than
the inflation index is used, the rates used should be docu-
mented.
A.Preliminary Analysis (Phase A) Cost Estimate. This
section provides a detailed cost proposal for performing the
Phase A Study. Detailed plans for the study should be de-
scribed, but reference may be made to the Technical Ap-
proach Section of Volume II.
In completing this section, the following instructions will
apply:
1. Contract Pricing Proposal.
(a) The cost proposal. It will include, as a summary of
total proposed Phase A costs, a completed SF 1411, as in-
cluded in Appendix C.
It is our understanding of the FARs that a 1411 is only
required if there is no competition. In the case of Discov-
ery there most likely will be much competition during
both steps. A 1411 triggers certain cost proposal re-
quirements regardless of the text of the cost proposal
instructions. The 1411 may require more cost data than
necessary or desirable.
(b) The SF 1411 must be signed by the proposer' s autho-
rized representative.
No comment.
2. Cost Elements Breakdown. To effectively evaluate
the Phase A cost proposal, NASA requires costs and support-
ing evidence stating the basis for the estimated costs. The
proposal will include, but is not limited to:
(a) Direct Labor.
(1) Explain the basis of labor-hour estimates for each
of the labor classifications. Are labor classifications
really useful?
(2) State the number of productive work-hours per
month.
No comment.
(3) Provide a schedule of the direct labor rates used in
the proposal. Discuss the basis for developing the pro-
posed direct labor rates including the cost centers in-
volved; the forward-pricing method (including mid-
point, escalation factors, anticipated impact of future
union contracts, etc.); and element included in the
rates, such as overtime, shift differential, incentives,
allowances, etc.
Cost centers needs to be defined. The term is am-
biguous. We suggest that cost center be defined as a
company, a NASA center, a university, etc. That is, each
member of a team be defined as a cost center.
(4) If available, submit evidence of Government ap-
proval of direct labor rates for proposal purposes for
each labor classification for the proposed performance
period.
No comment.
(5) If Civil Servant labor is to be used in support of the
Phase A study, but is not to be charged directly to the
investigation, then this labor must be considered as a
contribution by a domestic partner, subject to the same
restrictions as other contributions by domestic or for-
eign partners (i.e., the sum of such contributions should
not exceed approximately one-third of the Phase C/D
development cost to NASA).
Trying to price contributions from civil servants was a
problem. If total cost to NASA is to be the criteria then
this contribution must be estimated. Perhaps the next
A 0 couldprovide a formula based on Civil Servant labor
hours.
(b) Direct Material. Submit a breakdown of material
and parts, including basis for estimates and sources of supply,
if known. Describe any pricing factors added to material
prices, such as scrap, rework usage, etc.
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Is this detail necessary? We suggest just a total
materials cost for each priced CBS cell.
(c) Subcontracts. Identify fully each effort (task, item,
etc.) to be subcontracted, and list the selected subcontractors,
locations, amount proposed and types of contracts. Explain
the adjustments, if any, and the indirect rates (or burdens)
applied to the subcontractors' proposed amounts. Describe
fully the cost analysis or price analysis and the negotiations
conducted regarding the proposed subcontracts.
This level of detail seems appropriate for major sub-
contracts (<$500K), but not for all subcontracts.
(d) Other Direct Costs.
(1) Travel, Relocation, and Related Costs. (a) Indi-
cate destination, number of work-trips, duration, and
purpose. Specify total proposed cost of each trip.
Is this detail useful? We suggest number of work-
trips, duration, and purpose along with total cost for all
trips not individual trip cost.
(b) Explain or submit current company policy regard-
ing the reimbursement of travel and relocation costs
and the accounting treatment of such costs as direct
costs or indirect expenses. Submit copies of Govern-
ment approvals of such policies, as appropriate.
No comment.
(2) Computer. Describe the type of computer, the ex-
tent of usage, the rates, and the amounts. Explain where
associated labor costs (programmers, operators, etc.)
are included in the proposal.
This requirement seems to be a hangover from the
oM mainframe days. Nowadays, with rare exceptions,
we only use PCs. Suggest that we just include the cost
as a line item under ODC.
(3) Consultants. Indicate the specific task area or prob-
lem requiting consultant services. Identify the pro-
posed consultants, and state the quoted daily rate, the
estimated number of days, and associated costs (such as
travel), if any. State whether the consultant has been
compensated at the quoted rate for similar services
performed in connection with Government contracts.
No comment.
(4) Other. Explain and support any other direct costs
included in the Phase A proposal in a manner similar
to that described above.
No comment.
(e) Indirect Costs.
(1) List all indirect expense rates and their respective
cost centers used in the proposal. Indirect expense rates
(in the context of this AO) include labor overhead,
material overhead, general and administrative (G&A)
expenses, and any other cost proposed as an allocation
to the proposed direct costs.
No comment.
(2) If the proposal includes support services for which
off-site burden rates are used, provide a schedule of the
off-site burden rates. Include a copy of the company
policy regarding off-site vs. on-site effort.
No comment.
(3) If available, submit evidence of Government ap-
proval of any/all projected indirect rates for the pro-
posed period of performance. Indicate the status of rate
negotiations with the cognizant Government agency,
and provide a comparative listing of approved bidding
rates and negotiated actual rates for the past five (5)
fiscal years.
No comment.
(4) Identify separately any independent research and
development expenses included in the G&A rate.
This requirement is unclear. We do not want to pro-
vide JR&D details in the proposal Our G&A rates, which
do include JR&D, are negotiated and approved by the
Government.
3. Phase A Time-Phased Summary. Prepare a summary
of the total Phase A estimated costs summarized by cost
elements and time-phased by month. Note that direct labor
hours and rates should be shown by category (e.g., engineer-
ing, manufacturing, etc.). Overhead (or fringe) applied to this
labor may be shown by cost category or in total. Materials
amount and subcontract amount should include burdens, as
appropriate, and should be shown in total. Other direct costs
should be shown in total. G&A and other indirect costs (such
as internal research and development charges) should be
shown as appropriate.
Is the cost spread by labor category by month really
useful? For Phase A/B, we suggest that total cost and
total labor hours for each CBS is most useful for evalu-
ation. The CBS should be correlated with the SOW so it
is possible to relate cost and labor to each part of the
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SOW. Total cost, time phased by month or fiscal year,
can also be provided. The SF 1411 does require time
phasing. If the 1411 is not required then the Discovery
program office can decide on the appropriate level of
cost detail.
If the Phase A study has been completed, provide the actual
cost data in the same level of detail as requested for estimated
costs, to the extent possible.
No comment.
B. Technical Definition(PhaseB) Cost Estimate. This
section provides a cost estimate for performing the Technical
Definition (Phase B) study. Plans for the study should be
described, but reference may be made to the Technical Ap-
proach section of Volume 11.
If the Phase B study has been completed, provide the actual
cost data in the same level of detail as requested for estimated
costs, to the extent possible.
1. Completing this section, the guidelines for Phase A
apply except that the Contract Pricing Proposal is ONLY
REQUIRED FOR THOSE INVESTIGATIONS PROPOSED
TO BEGIN IN PHASE B.
Same comments as for Phase A apply.
C. Design/DevelopmentPhasefPhaseC/I)). Thissec-
tion provides a detailed cost proposal for performing Design/
Development Phase C/D. Plans for the Design/Development
phase (Phase C/D) should be described, and a correlation of
the costs with the technical approach should be included.
Reference may be made to the Technical Approach section of
Volume 11.
This paragraph should just state that the costs should
be correlated to the technical and management ap-
proach defined elsewhere in the proposal
In completing this section, the following guidelines will
apply:
1. Phase C/D CostBreakdown. A Cost Breakdown Struc-
ture (CBS) for every year of the Design/Development Phase
(Phase C/D) must be included in the proposal. This CBS shall
be to the subsystem level (level 3) for the flight system, and
for all other cost items at least the system level (level 2). The
value of all reserves, contributions, the cost of launch vehicles
and services, and any facility and equipment costs shall also
be included.
Defining a level (level 2, level 3, etc.) causes us to
create a CBS that is different than we usually use and
makes it more difficult to relate to a SO W. We prefer that
the instructions state something like:
Costs and BOEs shall be provided: to the subsystem
level (ACS, Propulsion, etc.) for the spacecraft and to
the instrument level for the payload. All other costs and
BOEs shall be provided at the major task level (program
management, systems engineering, etc.).
Regarding TDs and BOEs.
The SOW should be the TDs. It is redundant and
perhaps confusing to require a SOW and TDs. The SOW
defines the work products to be provided for each CBS
cell.
The BOE describes the methods and sources used to
estimate the labor hours, cost, materials, and subcon-
tracts at the required level For hardware the BOE in-
cludes an equipment list with the major components
their sources and heritage and cost detail where appro-
priate. The BOE needs enough detail so an evaluator
can make a reasonable assessment of the validity of the
cost proposal Detailed material lists (resistors, wire,
etc.) should not be required. A total materials cost should
be adequate.
The Design/Development phase should be summarized by
major elements of cost for each cost category in the CBS. The
elements of cost for the Phase C/D cost estimates should
include the following, as a minimum.
No comment.
(a)DirectLabor. List by labor category, with labor hours
and rates for each. This should correlate with the workforce
staffing plan discussed below in Section 2. If Civil Servant
labor is to be used, but is not to be charged directly to the
investigation, ther. this labor must be considered as a contri-
bution by a domestic partner, subject to the same restrictions
as other contributions by domestic or foreign partners (i.e.,
the sum of such contributions should not exceed approxi-
mately one-third of the Phase C/D development cost to NASA).
See previous comments on labor categories and civil
servants.
(b) Materials. This should give the best estimate of the
total cost of the bill of materials. Identify separately the
estimated cost of major items, if known.
Major items should be defined. We suggest that major
items be defined as important components of a sub-
system (gyros, a computer, fuel tank, etc.) or costing
more than some amount, say $ lOOK.
(c) Subcontracts. List any major subcontracts (antici-
pated and known), and the basis for estimated costs.
Major subcontracts >$500K.
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(d) Other Direct Costs. Include launch vehicles and
services, facilities, and equipment. Any costs that are not
covered elsewhere, including insurance, travel, etc., should
be itemized here.
Itemization should be at a summary level by major
category.
(e) Indirect Costs. This includes all overhead, general
and administrative, fee, and any other miscellaneous ex-
penses related to the overall business.
No comment.
2. Provide a preliminary workforce staffing plan. One
that includes all management, technical (scientific and engi-
neering), and support staff by fiscal year.
Perhaps this overall staffing plan is enough data on
labor classification that cost by labor category is not
required in a. above.
3. The cost estimate. It shall include all burdens and
profit/fee in real-year dollars by fiscal year, assuming the
inflation rates used by NASA (provided in Appendix E) or
specifically identified industry forward-pricing rates.
No comment.
4. Provide a description of the cost-estimating model(s)
and techniques used in your Phase C/D cost estimate. Dis-
cuss the heritage of the models applied to this estimate includ-
ing any known differences between missions contained in the
models and key attributes of the proposed mission. Include
the assumptions used as the basis for the Phase C/D cost and
identify those that are critical to cost sensitivity in the inves-
tigation. Discuss the project risks that result from an uncer-
tainty analysis of the cost estimate and provide the attendant
total cost estimate range these risks create. Discuss the meth-
odology by which all cost risks will be identified, tracked, and
mitigated by the technical management process applied in
this investigation. Identify any "discounts" assumed in the
cost estimates for business practice initiatives or streamlined
technical approaches. Describe how these have been incorpo-
rated in the cost estimate and will be managed by the inves-
tigation team.
Suggest this paragraph be deleted. If a proposer uses
models he she can describe them in the BOEs. Risk
analysis can be required as part of the technical and or
management sections.
5. Provide a funding obligation plan. One for the pro-
posed funding requirements of the investigation by annum
keyed to the work schedule.
No comment.
6. Provide a schedule for accomplishing Phase C/D ac-
tivities. All funded schedule margins should be identified.
Schedules should be part of the management section
but could be duplicated in the cost section.
7. ContractPricingProposal. (ONLYREQUIREDFOR
THOSE INVESTIGATIONS PROPOSED TO BEGIN IN
PHASE C/D).
No commenL
(a) The cost proposal. It will include, as a summary of
total proposed Phase C/D costs, a completed SF 1411, as
included in Appendix C.
Only required if there is no competition.
(b) The SF 1411 must be signed by the proposer' s autho-
rized representative.
No comment.
D. Mission Operations Phase (Phase E) Cost Estimate.
This section provides a cost estimate for performing the
Mission Operations for Phase E. Reference may be made to
the Technical Approach section of Volume II. In completing
this section, the guidelines for Phase C/D apply.
The C/D comments apply here.
E. Total Mission Cost (TMC) Estimate. This section
should summarize the estimated costs to be incurred in Phases
A through E including the following:
1. Preliminary Analysis Study, Phase A.
2. Technical Definition, Phase B.
3. Design and Development Phase, Phase C/D.
4. Mission Operations andDataAnalysis Phase, Phase E.
5. Launch vehicle, upper stages, and launch services.
6. Mission-unique costs to the Deep Space Network and
other ground system costs.
7. Cost of activities associated with technology transfer
and programs for social or educational benefits (if not incor-
porated in any of Phases A through E).
This section should include: Detailed plans for all as-
pects of the mission not discussed elsewhere in this volume,
including the launch vehicle, upper stages, and launch ser-
vices; Deep Space Network and other ground systems; activi-
ties associated with technology transfer and programs for
social or educational benefits. Reference may be made to the
Technical Approach section of Volume II. In completing this
section, the following guidelines will apply:
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No comment.
1. Funding Profile Versus Time. A summary of the Total
Mission Cost time-phased by fiscal year must be included in
the format shown in Figure D2. Dollar amounts should be
shown in real-year dollars. Total Mission Costs should be
summarized in both real-year and FY92 dollars in the last two
columns of this table. This summary should represent the
optimum funding profile for the mission. Assets provided as
contributions by international or other partners should be
included, and clearly identified, as separate line items.
No comment.
2. Total Mission Cost Breakdown by Institutional
Category. A summary of the total costs to NASA for the
investigation, broken down by institutional categories (i.e.,
educational institutions, industry, nonprofit institutions,
NASA Centers, and other Government agencies) and using
the template in Figure D3, should be included. Participation
by small, minority- or women-owned, and/or otherwise dis-
advantaged businesses should also be highlighted, as should
participation by historically black colleges and universities or
by other minority institutions. Indicate the page(s) in the
proposal where the participation of each institution is docu-
mented.
No comment.
F. Tracking and Phasing of Schedule Margins and
Cost Reserves. Specific margins and reserves in cost and
schedule should be identified by phase and year and the
rationale for them discussed. The specific means by which
costs will be tracked and managed should be defined. Specific
reserves and the timing of their application, if needed, should
be described within the proposal. This should include the
strategy for maintaining reserves as a function of cost-to-
completion. All funded schedule margins should be identi-
fied. The relationship between the use of such reserves, mar-
gins, potential descope options, and their effect on cost,
schedule, and performance should be fully discussed.
This important requirement, which should also in-
clude a fee plan, probably belongs in the management
section as part of the management plan. This is sug-
gested because the reserve and management plan should
be evaluated by management experts rather than cost
experts.

LPI Technical Report 95-03 13
Workshop Presentations
Science Community Perspectives
William V. Boynton, University of Arizona m
What Was "Right"?
Selection was by the book
•:- Politics had little to do with the selection
• Exception: Getting Congress involved was deplorable
•:. Weighting factors were followed
Great care was taken to have a very rigorous review
Debriefings were very valuable and informative
AO was thorough and explicit
What Was Wrong?
Selection was by the book
•:o Weighting factors were followed
o:- Evaluation criteria were wrong (obviously subjective)
Community is in the dark as to what was selected and why
°:. Other than initial press release, I know of no description of the missions
* Exception: Binder was liberal with passing out fact sheets
°:- What are the science goals?
* How are they going to achieve them?
What is their education and outreach program like?
Other nonproprietary information would be useful
Perception = Reality?
Don't know
•"- More information from NASA would help
Science community support will be important for program to succeed (or continue)
o:- Code SL uses scientists to satisfy NASA's goals for the nation
•:- Scientists use NASA to allow them to advance their scientific understanding and create
new knowledge for students
Openness at this point would allow the community to assess what is REALLY good and what is bad
about the program and make suggestions for change
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Science Community Attitude
Originally very enthusiastic about the Discovery Program
•:- As a way to do good science
•:- As a way to get project management more responsive to science
University as a lead institution was an important part of that
o:- Peer-reviewed missions were thought to be a good idea
Got mission selection out into the open
Much of the science community is now soured on the Program
•:- Rightly or wrongly
•:. Feels that cost was given too much emphasis
•:. Feels that many first-rate missions were passed over
• Selected missions were not like those being recommended by committees
• Selected missions were not "mainstream" but could have been
Perceived / Real Problems
Not a university-based program
•:. Originally Discovery sold as a partnership with universities, industry, and government with
universities as the lead
o:. Evaluation made it difficult to run one of these from a university, even one with experience
with large space projects
• This was fair that the lesser experience of a university with big projects compared
with, for example, JPL, be given some weight to compensate for the added risk
• But there appeared to be no offsetting strength in having a university lead to balance
• If NASA sees no advantage in the Discovery Program having more of a university
component than past missions, it should state that explicitly
Difficulty in getting a competent review panel
o:. Most knowledgeable investigators were involved in proposals
•:. Requirement to eliminate even the hint of a conflict kept good people off the panel
• Scientists could probably review the quality of the science but would be unable
to judge the likely success of the approach
More Perceived / Real Problems
No way to
o:.
fold programmatics and long-range strategy into selection decision
Strategy means looking over the very long term (10-15 years) to formulate a program
that gets the data necessary to answer the big questions
National Academy of Sciences sets the strategy
NASA is charged to implement the strategy
Science evaluation (presumably) was on basis of its intrinsic merit and not much weight
given on how it helps fill in the strategy
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Opportunity was a sham
o:. Evaluation weights did not reflect the public rhetoric coming from NASA
•:. Pluses for use of new technology did not balance minuses from risk
•:. Education and public outreach were worth less than two percent of score
More Perceived / Real Problems (Costs)
Cost given too much emphasis
o:- Formal weight was only slightly greater than science
•:- Science was probably not ranked with the full dynamic range of cost (i.e., suspicion is that
most science was good to excellent)
•:. Future cost to implement the NASA strategy not considered (for example)
• A $200M mission with "very good" science that addresses half of the first-order
science objectives for a body
• A $300M mission with "excellent" science that addresses all the objectives
• If the former is selected, another $200M mission is needed for a total cost of $400M
vs. only $300M to do the one complete mission
More Problems with Cost Evaluation
Evaluation of cost on the basis of what NASA says it will cost, rather than what the proposer says,
seems strange for a cost-capped program
•:- What is the award; what the proposer requests or what NASA thought it would take?
• If the former, than it makes no sense to do the evaluation on the basis of the
NASA-estimated cost
• If the latter, it seems unreasonable for NASA to award more than the proposer asks
for when its estimate is higher, and it seems unfair to award less, if its estimate
is less than the proposer asked
• But if the evaluation is based on a low NASA-determined cost, it seems unfair to the
other proposers that the evaluation be based on one number and the award be
given on the basis of another
• If the policy is to award no more than what is asked, the evaluation should be on
those costs and the appropriate risk assigned to success on the basis of the
proposed cost
What Should NASA Do?
Decide what goals they want the program to accomplish for the nation
•:- Is education and outreach really important?
•:- Is technology transfer and infusion really important?
•:- How important is the small and small/disadvantaged business involvement?
•:- How important is university and student involvement?
• Currently it is less important than minority involvement
•:- Is it really business as usual with missions being managed by NASA centers?
•:. Structure the program to reflect these goals
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Make the words from NASA reflect the reality
Publish details on the missions
-:. From proposal: fact sheets, executive summary, science, opportunity, management
Evaluate costs on the basis of proposed costs and the risk of the proposer being able to do it at the
proposed cost.
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C. T. Russell, University of California, Los Angeles n
Discovery Experience
San Juan Capistrano
•:. PI--Venus Orbiter- IRJLightning/Ions
• Not selected
•:- Co-I--Mercury Orbiter- Imaging/Lidar/Magnetosphere
• Selected for pre-phase-A study
Announcement of Opportunity
•". PI--Diana - SEP mission to Moon and Comet
• Not selected
o:- Co-I--Hermes - Mercury Orbiter
• Not selected
•:- IDS---VESAT - Venus Orbiter - IR
• Not selected
NEAR
•:. Team member, magnetometer
Science Advisory Experience
Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee
Space Science Board
Committee on Data Management and Computation
Planetary Science Data Steering Group
Numerous ad hoc studies
Participant in many planetary missions
Apollo 15
Apollo 16
Pioneer Venus Orbiter
Vega 1,2
Phobos
Galileo
Mars 96
Cassini
NEAR
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The First Two Discovery Missions
Mars Pathfinder
o:- Seemingly arbitrarily chosen
•:- Principally an engineering mission
•:- Strong non-U.S, science contribution
•:- JPL appears to be managing it well
•:. Dead-end project
NEAR
o:- Had strong science support
•:. No apparent competition for spacecraft
o:. No apparent competition for mission operations
•:- Science team brought on late in project
o:o APL is doing a good job
-:. Should be a good first asteroid mission
San Juan Capistrano
The Numbers
-:. 73 Submissions
o:. 4 Selection panels
•:- 2 Ratings
The Process
o:- Oral presentation
o:- Evaluation of 10-page white paper
o:- Rapid decision on 10+ winners
The Result
•:. Surprise
o:. Uneven assessments by panels
°:. No coherence to selected program
•:. Obvious holes - lunar
-:. I0+ underfunded teams
Pre-Phase-A Study
o:. Too little money
-:. Too long a period
o:. Much thought and discussion
-:. Ideas and designs matured
-:. Seemed principally a holding pattern until the real program began
o:. Most progress when AO was imminent
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The Draft AO
o:. Released in early 1994
•:. Helped guide final directions ofpre-phase-A studies
•:. Enabled problems in instructions to be removed, reducing cost of proposal preparation
and providing better balance in technical vs. cost sections of the proposal
•:. The resulting AO was good document
•:. The delay in the release of the AO was disconcerting
•:. The lowering of the cost cap after the AO was released was inexcusable
Selection Criteria in AO
•:. "Cost and Management" will have approximately the same importance as "Science,
Technical Approach, and Opportunity"
•:- Science will be rated at approximately the same weight as the combination of Technical
Approach and Opportunity
•:- Technical Approach will be weighted significantly more than opportunity
•:- Cost will be more important than Management
Lessons Learned
Science Objectives
o:. Neither NASA's nor the Academy's planetary exploration strategy was factored into
selection.
•:o Quality of science was assessed but not the quantity. For example, two bodies completely
explored were no more important than one body explored.
o:- Science ratings were quite different than we were used to experiencing.
Past Rankings Category Result
Excellent 1
Very Good 2
Good 4
May receive funding
Consolation prize
Kiss of death
Discovery Rankings
Excellent ok
Very Good ok
Good ok
Lessons Learned
Evaluation Process
•:- Science evaluation took place week of fall AGU meeting. The week most active planetary
scientists are fully committed.
•:o Potential first-rate evaluators had to decline to participate due to prior commitments.
•:o Errors in interpretation and misunderstandings of the proposals occurred but no questions
were asked. One of these misunderstandings was thought to be fatal for Diana!
•:o The one question that I was asked was addressed clearly in the proposal.
o:. It was clear early that the evaluation process was flawed.
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Lessons Learned
Costing
o:o
°:°
°:°
Costing is a very inexact science.
Industry and NASA Centers are not very frank with each other about costs.
Unexpected and unexplained costs were added by JPL at the last minute.
Cost models were used to evaluate proposals that may have favored one set of approaches
over another unfairly.
Cost models are not available for SEP.
Different proposers took different approaches to determining costs.
Lessons Learned
New Technologies
•:. Cost risk.
o:. Schedule risk.
•:. Cost models overprice new technology, especially SEE
o:. Use of new technology is a net negative in proposal evaluation, no matter how important
the introduction of that new technology.
-:. Solar Electric Propulsion would open up a whole new era of planetary exploration at
reduced costs, yet it might as well have been the introduction of a new washer as far as
evaluation was concerned.
•:. Use of old technology was rewarded.
Lessons Learned
Expense
o_.
o_o
°t.
oZ.
Discovery proposal preparation can be very expensive.
Perhaps $0.5M was spent by many of the teams.
Very good pre-phase-A studies resulted.
Since selection did not seem to reflect the depth of the pre-phase-A study, much effort
seems to have been wasted.
If only "high-level" concepts desired then AO should say so.
Community cannot afford the expense required to prepare Discovery proposals at this
level on a continuing basis.
Lessons Learned
Partnerships
o:. Discovery mode necessitated partnerships: industry, centers, universities.
o:. Partnerships require meaningful sharing of responsibilities--ownership of part of the
effort.
-:. Meaningful sharing of responsibility means complex organization charts.
o:. Complex management with checks and balances is viewed as a negative.
o:. A meaningful partnership with split responsibilities was a negative in the evaluation
process.
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Lessons Learned
Science Centers: Friend or Foe?
o:- Goddard and JPL have scientific as well as engineering efforts.
•:, These centers look out for their scientists.
• do not work on competing efforts
• refuse to assist unless center scientists involved
•:, These centers do not provide partial assistance, e.g., operations but not program
management.
Conclusions
•:. Many mistakes appear to have been made in the evaluation process this time.
•:- Even if there were no mistakes, many questions whether in the presently constrained
environment whether we can afford to fund merely good science.
•:- We need to learn how to correctly cost modern spacecraft, built in competitive environ-
ments. Too much of our cost experience is based on situations where funding was not
capped and there was no competition.
•:- We need to learn how to evaluate science return quantitatively so that the science per
dollar is known and factored into the evaluation process.
•:. Excellent selections will lead to a strong, continuing Discovery program.
•:- Merely good selection will lead to dissatisfaction with the program and its eventual
demise.
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Industry Perspectives l
D. Roalstad, Ball Aerospace m
THE DISCOVERY PROCESS IS INNOVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE
Improvements Experienced
IPDT is a winning ingredient formulation process.
o:- No force fits (some exceptions)
•:o Avoidance of intermediary functions
•:. Avoidance of institutional demands
o:o Smallest possible team
PI leadership for high science return
o:. Direct control of trades to maximize science
•:- Responsibility with authority
Manageable Programmatic Guidelines
°:. Cost and schedule (risk, technology, science, trades)
•:- Contingency management (PI responsibility)
Improved Procurement Process
o:o Demonstrated so far
•:. Improvements possible from recommendations
Progress has been made -- "Lessons Learned will refine"
Cost B A Primary Issue of Concern
Can science return per dollar be determined?
Should cost outweigh science for AO selection?
Is AO proposal detail cost information meaningful?
Are innovative ideas squelched with early cost emphasis?
Should AO proposal cost information be eliminated?
Cost discriminators should be based only on well-studied concepts and engineering details.
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B. C. Clark, Lockheed Martin m
Discovery Missions -- The Concept
A New Way of Thinking
•:° Mind-stretching
-:. Lag time in generating concepts
•:. Are we all in sync yet?
Architecture Fostered New Competitive Approaches
o:. Academia/industry/government forced on equal footing
o:. Emphasis on minimization of cost and complexity
Revolutionary Jump Beyond Performance-Based Specs
o:. Team defines the goals, program, and solutions
•:- Teams formed around program's needs (altruistic division of work tasks)
Essential to the Future of Planetary Science
o:- Multiple opportunities hold the scientists in the field
o:. Multiple opportunities foster industry interest and investment
What We Did
Outstanding Set of Worthy Missions
o:. Existence proof of excellent science at affordable levels
Multiple Potential Winners Led to Distributed Effort
o:. Major involvement in 8 missions (7 spacecraft, 1 integrated payload)
o:. Minor involvement in 2 other missions
AO Response was a Major Effort
o:. Not the typical AO; much more like an RFP and not unexpected
o:. Standardization of responses was not as feasible as hoped
o:- Work effort was excessive, but irrevocably locked into several proposals
Delays in AO Issuance was Major Perturbation
°:. Resulted in additional expense
o:. Difficult to keep team on track
Smaller, Less Complex is Indeed Cheaper
°:. Avoid big-program syndromes
(exponentiation of communications and conservatisms)
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Principle Investigator as Leader
Wide Range of PI Characteristics
•:- Ranged from instrument/experiment specialists to theoreticians
•:o Ranged from hands-on to hands-off approaches to management
•:- How can/did the evaluation team consider these variations?
Relationships of PI, Project Managers, and S/C Managers
•:. Academia/industry/government in novel relationships
•:. Stimulated revolutionary thinking
Good-PI Dilemma
•:o Each felt their science objective was sure winner
•:. Highly competent PIs already very busy; some also have talent for management
•:° PIs not always comfortable with highly structured schedules (science sets its own pace)
Team Building
•:- Scientists became engineers; engineers became scientists
•". Badgeless, altruistic attitude developed
The Evaluation
Thoroughness Matched the Effort
•:o Large, systematic team evaluation commensurate with large, detailed proposals
Debriefs were Outstanding
•:. Thorough, specific, definitive
o:. Extremely valuable for assisting future actions
Focused Science
•:- The 1 to 3 instruments concept (San Juan Capistrano) not propagated to the AO
•:o Unclear if highly-focused science was favorable as expected.., some downchecks
from scientists (Catch-22 situation)
The Future
Evaluating the Science/Cost Ratio
o:. Cost is easy
•:- Science vs. science is more difficult to evaluate numerically
• Begin with rank-ordering
• Use adjectival descriptors (is the investigation essential? amount/fidelity of information?
breadth of applicability?)
• Pivotal to assign as large a point spread as possible
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Should There Be a "Small Mission Set-Aside?"
•:- Balance between cheapest missions and more rewarding/more expensive missions
•:- Don't throw the baby out with the wash
Do Mars or Outer Planet or Asteroid Missions Have a Chance?
•:. Mars Surveyor Program
•:- Pluto Flyby Program
•:. NEAR Mission
•:. New Millennium Program
Relationships to Other Programs
•:. Mars Surveyor Program
•:- New Millennium Program
•:. Overlaps of mission goals/targets
Additional Recommendations
Consider a Multistep Process
o:. Step1:
Screening to reduce the field to a reasonable number of semi-finalists (8?)
25 total pages, combined science/technical/outreach/management/cost
(defer Outreach to Step 2)
45 days to prepare and submit
45 days to evaluate and down-select
.:. Step 2:
Proposal using the '94 AO level of detail
60 days to prepare and submit
60 days to evaluate and down-select
•:. Steps 3 and 4:
Proceed as currently planned (run-off between two or three finalists)
Cost Categorization and Definitization for Step 1
o:. Example: Nearest $25M increment estimated cost
o:. Clarify criteria: Total mission cost vs. peak funding vs. C/D funding
Cost Floor
°:. Hitting a barrier for several highly interesting and important missions
°:. Law of diminishing returns
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Discovery Program Represents a New Way of Doing Business
The Discovery Program was characterized by new ideas
•:. Fly a mission every 12 to 18 months
•:. Cap costs at $150M
o:. PI led partnerships with industry and government centers
Overwhelming response from industry, academia, and government centers
•:. San Juan Capistrano 73 Submissions
•:. NASA funded pre-phase-A studies 11 Missions
•:. Response to AO 28 Responses
•:- Chosen for implementation 1
•:. Chosen for phase A studies 3
It is encouraging that NASA has organized this workshop
o:. New ideas produced overwhelming response--and selection shock
o:. Without revisions, will the next AO receive the same response? Has it impacted Midex
and New Millennium?
Discovery is one of several "new ways" of doing business with NASA
•:- Can these other "new ways" help refine the Discovery process?
Workshop Charter: Develop recommendations for the next AO
How Can TRW Contribute to the Goals of this Workshop?
Reaffirm Support and Enthusiasm for the Discovery Program
Encourage implementation of selected missions
•:. Allow selected teams to demonstrate their proposed competence
•". Support notion that teams live up to their proposed responsibility
•:. Terminate when performance does not meet proposed performance
Identify issues for splinter group discussion
•:. Science and Return on Investment
o:. Technology vs Risk: Mission Success; and other factors
•:. Cost
•:. AO/AO Process Changes and Program Management
Science and Return on Investment Issues
•:- Will current emphasis on low cost and risk reduction encourage conservative science
for the next round?
•:- Should proposed Discovery Missions relate to NASA-defined solar system objectives
and be evaluated according to their proposed achievement?
•". Should the metrics of science return on investment be applied to all Code S-type
programs?
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Technology vs. Risk: Mission Success; and Other Factor Issues
•:- Were programs selected on their ability to propose acceptable risk, or the conservatism
of the evaluation process?
•:- What is the impact on future AO responses when higher-risk missions are penalized during
the evaluation process?
•:- If evaluators find a risk is unacceptable, should proposers be allowed to present additional
data to show the risk is tolerable or there is an adequate risk mitigation?
Cost Issues
•:- Given the heavy weighting of cost during the evaluation, does a cost cap make sense or
should a target cost be specified?
•:. Should the proposal/evaluation process be modified to allow the proposers to demonstrate
cost credibility through new ways of doing business?
•:- Are current cost models adequate for evaluating 28 diverse mission proposals?
•:. Can incentives and penalties be built into the process that encourage more realistic
proposals?
AO/AO Process Changes and Program Management Issues
•:- Are the length of the Discovery process and the investment resources required to support
the process excessive?
•:- Would completion of science evaluation prior to parmership proposal preparation process
reduce program process time and investment?
•:. Given the 24 proposals that were not winners, what is the basis for resubmitting any of
these again? Would the same evaluation process be used in the next round?
•:. How does the Discovery "new way" of doing business relate to other NASA "new ways"
of doing business?
•:. Will the New Millennium Program impact the AO content for the next round of
Discovery?
Summary Comments
Discovery must do more science for less money
Current climate: less money for science
More knowledge is always better
But what is the limit?
American
o:.
needs a sense of priorities to guide diminished spending
Federal R&D budget decline leads to industry budget decline
Balancing federal budget and corporate efficiency must not jeopardize future
Can metrics be applied to adequacy of R&D spending
o:. American competitiveness in solar exploration
o:. Value of result vs. investment
Contributions from young scientists to maintain continuity of talent and progress
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D. Gump, LunaCorp
LunaCorp
o.*.
°.-o
Founded in 1989 to find private funding for space exploration
Formed Lunar Eclipse Software subsidiary in 1993
* Authored/published Return to the Moon CD-ROM in 1993
* Authored/published Mission: Planet Earth CD-ROM in 1994
1998 Lunar Rover Mission
• Will land two teleoperated rovers on the lunar surface
* Red Whittaker of Carnegie Mellon University Robotics Institute is designing and
building the rovers
* Mission cost is $150 million
• Revenue from entertainment, television, corporate, and research customers
* Public participation is key component of mission
*Mission Control will be at theme park
*Theme park visitors will drive the rovers live and explore via telepresence
Data Purchase as Discovery Option
•:- Discovery rules should allow the purchase of science data from commercial missions as
alternative to NASA-managed projects
o:. Rules excluded LunaCorp in last round
•"- LunaCorp has offered NASA lunar surface data for low cost
• $300,000 per payload pound
• $7,000 per dedicated rover time
•:o Data purchase is only strategy likely to secure New Start funding from Congress
Data Purchase Contracts
o:o Data purchase contracts should have same progress payments and completion penalties as
NASA-managed projects
• Majority of contract money is paid out prior to launch
• Launching the mission satisfies most contractor requirements
• Successful return of data releases the final 10% of the contracted amount
•:- To protect government, the data seller must post bonds to guarantee repayment if mission
doesn't launch. This should constitute the only financial test the company must satisfy.
•:° In comparing proposals, the costs should be all-inclusive:
• Including cost of launch vehicle and launch site/range
• Including estimates of the government's self-insurance costs
• Including mission operating costs
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THE LUNACORP TEAM
Thomas F. Rogers, chairman of the board. As Pentagon's Deputy Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, he was responsible for the general design and deployment of the first global
satellite communications sytem.
David Gump, president. Mr. Gump is founding publisher of Space Business News, author of Space
Enterprise: Beyond NASA, and former marketer for Geostar Messaging Corporation.
Victoria Beckner, public relations and marketing manager. Ms. Beckner is a former political con-
sultant, and as a NASA contractor she headed up public relations for the Microgravity Sci-
ence and Applications Division. She is the founder and former editor of Microgravity News.
James Dunstan, executive vice president. Mr. Dunstan is a partner at Haley, Bader & Potts, an
Arlington law firm active in communications and space law.
Rick Tumlinson, director. President of the Space Frontier Foundation in New York.
Philip Culbertson, advisor. Mr. Culbertson is a former general manager of NASA.
Walt Anderson, director. Founder of Mid Atlantic. He is now chairman of Esprit Telecom, the first
pan-European carrier in the newly deregulated communications market in Europe.
Dr. William C. Stone, director. Dr. Stone is the developer of the MK-2R backpack, a computer-
controlled diving rebreather.
Scott Carpenter, advisor. During the Mercury program, Scott Carpenter was the second American
to reach orbit, piloting his Aurora 7 capsule in May 1962.
Paul J. Coleman, Ph.D., advisor. Professor of space physics at UCLA and President of the Univer-
sities Space Research Association, a 76-university consortium.
Patrick Quentin Collins, Ph.D., advisor. Former consultant at the European Space Agency's
Research and Technology Centre, he has taught at Imperial College in London since 1983 and
is currently a visiting professor in Japan.
Allan S. Hill, advisor. At Boeing and Northrup Space Laboratories, Mr. Hill designed and developed
the Burner II and IIA Thor and Atlas upper stages and the Saturn S-IC booster stage.
Edward J. Martin, advisor. During his fifteen years at the Communications Satellite Corp.
(COMSAT), Mr. Martin's posts included Vice President, Technology Management, and Vice
President, International Operations.
George E. Mueller, Ph.D., advisor. Dr. Mueller is President of the International Academy of Astro-
nautics. He was NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Spaceflight from the start of
the Gemini program through the second Apollo landing.
For more reference, see Popular Science, June 1994 issue, and Newsweek, December 5, 1994 issue.
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Government/FFRDC Perspectives
G. Scott Hubbard, NASA Ames Research Center n
AMES CENTER PERSPECTIVE
Summary
Discovery is an excellent Program (a number of people deserve credit for making it happen)
Don't make drastic changes
Fine tune a few areas
Ames Support for Discovery: Past, Present and Future
Past:
Planetary science and project development at Ames consistent with Discovery
•:o Small/medium projects (Pioneers 6-13, Galileo probe), numerous PIs and instruments
•:- Development approach has been teaming with industry
o:- Minimize requirements growth, be cost effective, utilize small management oversight team
Participated in first Discovery Science Working Group in December 1989; all subsequent SWGs
and workshops
Present:
Involvement in current Discovery project development
•:. Developed Mars Pathfinder (MESUR) mission concept at Ames in 1990
•:. Collaboration with JPL on Pathfinder entry/descent/landing system and instrumentation
Discovery AO selections--Ames-related involvement
o:- Lunar Prospector: NASA Center and Co-Investigator
o:° Venus Multiprobe Mission and Stardust: Co-Investigators
Future Summary:
Discovery represents a unique opportunity for planetary missions
•:- Open competition peer review is the best mechanism for selection
•:. Process is complementary to proposed Ames Institute
Discovery AO General Comments
AO accommodated a wide range of proposals
•:o Diverse scientific and technical interests should be maintained
Overall, the AO was clear and provided the background and guidelines necessary to write
the proposals
•:- Some repetition could be eliminated and details improved
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The importance of science/cost ratio was not fully appreciated by all proposers
•:. Prior instrument AOs were based primarily on science excellence
•:. Future AOs should maintain the emphasis on cost containment
Proposals required significant resource commitment
o:. Necessary aspect to yield high-fidelity cost data, but may limit participation
Discovery AO Detailed Comments
Rapid procurement process was enabled by Discovery process
o:. Certification (SF-1411) of cost data was key to rapid contract award
•:. Funding level uncertainty and delay in funding arrival at center slowed process
o:. For consistent interpretation of"selection statement" might seek statement from
HQ procurement
Some budgetary terms were confusing
o:. For example, cost vs. price, "contributed cost" vs. "actual" dollars
•:. Provide more clarification in future AO
Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business goals were very challenging
-:. Could lead to significant risk in management complexity; performance should be reviewed
as program progresses
Program Management Plan was not approved prior to the AO release
-:. The draft plan should be finalized and published
The requirements to incorporate new technology and minimize risk are contradictory
-:. Need further discussion of the role of new technology
Provide cost requirements in a more easily understandable format
•:o Mixture of FY92, real year and current year costs were confusing
Ames and Discovery: Summary
Overall Discovery AO process was very positive
Discovery AO allowed a broad range of proposals
-:. Maintain this aspect
Continue to emphasize cost-effective science
-'- Science/$$ is the bottom line for healthy future
Fine tune process in certain areas
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Observations, Thoughts, Issues
o:. Generally the Discovery concept is valid and is working
•:. Improvements can be made in the process, some significant--focus on these
•:. Discovery was a huge paradigm shift with significant and steep learning curve--but now
we know, and it will be easier the next time
•:- Overall, the amount of effort and/or investment required to get to the final outcome was
too high
• Significant NASA, industry, and JPL investments
o:- Continue to form partnerships early--H, IP, and JPL
• Wait until final AO to form proposal teams
• Use draft AO period to check the science, cost, and players to confirm proposal
concept validity
•"° Don't change goal posts in the middle of the process
o:- Focus on the AO; eliminate other up-front effort
•:o Have a draft AO with final AO 60 days later and allow 90 days for proposal preparation;
stick to the schedule
o:° Simplify the AO and the proposal outline and contentsnprovide a very clear concise
definition of the required proposal contents and only ask for information once and only
that needed for evaluation
•:° Select the next Discovery Mission starts (#5 and #6) directly from the proposals; don't do
a two-phase selection or down-select
•:. The Discovery process with partnering/teaming and NASA HQ selection greatly
streamlines the procurement process
•:- Continue and improve the JPL Locomo thrust and workshop
•:° Continue dialog with industry to improve partnering and teaming arrangements
•:- Find a better way to link the Discovery Program's outcomes with Code SL's fundamental
science goals
•:. The evaluation outcome did not meet expectations with regard to technology
infusion/application
•:- The phase A funding shortfall was a rude surprise; don't do this again
o:. Must support the selected missions' negotiated funding profile
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L. J. Crawford, E. L. Reynolds, and R. W. Farquhar, Applied Physics
Lab, Johns Hopkins University n
JHU/APL Proposal Involvement
•:- COmet N__ucleus TOUR (CONTOUR)
•:. N__earEarth Asteroid R__eturned Sample (NEARS)
-:. REndezvous with a COmet Nucleus (RECON)
Presentation Outline
•:. Announcement of Opportunity
o:. Evaluation Process
o:. Debriefing Process
o:. Technology vs. Risk
°:. Evaluation Criteria
o:. Science vs. Cost
•:. Program Management
NASA's Discovery Program Selection Process
Excellent Science
Volume H
Poor Science
Very Expensive Etc. Volume III Low Cost (Cheap)
Good Management
Low Risk
Good Schedule
Major Shortcomings
Concept of "Highest Science Per Unit Cost" is fundamentally flawed.
o:. Cannot establish minimum "science floor"
o:. Drives community to "lowest common denominator" science
Reliance on model to provide government-generated costs was unfortunate.
o:. Model over estimate costs
o:. Models do not reflect new ways of doing business
Use of industrial contractor (SAIC) in evaluation process was inappropriate.
Minimal use of contractor's past performance in source selection not in step with current
government trends.
o:. Minimum weight of 25% for past performance is new federal guidance
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Alternative Discovery Selection Process
Establish two or three classes of Discovery Missions, then don't compete on basis of cost (will max
science for each category)
Launch Vehicle C/D Cost Range ($FY92)
1. Delta-2 100-150
2. Med-Lite 50-100
3. Pegasus <50
Compete missions within each class.
Science value is primary factor in selection.
Discovery Program would include some mix of mission classes [content of mix" TBD].
Announcement of Opportunity
Too much information was requested (e.g., cost)
Not enough page allotment for amount of information requested
Next AO should contain numerical weights for each selection criteria
Use only "one year dollars," not several, e.g., 92, 94, real year
Evaluation Process
o:o Evaluation process was defined and describable.
•:- Scatter-chart approach instantly removed missions viewed as moderately expensive and
very expensive, even though they had excellent science and remained under the $150 M
cost cap.
•"- Aggressive missions with substantial science return were penalized because they were
compared with simpler, cheaper missions primarily on the basis of cost.
•"- Use of industrial contractors like SAIC in evaluation process is inappropriate.
o:- Use of contractor-demonstrated performance in evaluating ability to deliver (cost,
schedule, technical performance).
•:- Reasonableness of contractor cost estimates.
• Don't just use government cost estimates derived from models (models are known to
overestimate).
• New guidance issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recommends
using past performance (weighted at a minimum of 25%) for source selection in
govemment contracts [ref. Federal Contracts Report 0014-9063/95, 5/8/95].
•"- Process was very much business as usual and did not reflect new ways of doing business.
• Hard to see that innovation was rewarded.
Debriefing Process
°:- Debrief sessions were very useful, informative, open, well executed.
•:- State the weighting factors for each category.
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Technology vs. Risk
o:. Proposals were both rewarded and penalized for new technology insertion.
•:. Discovery originally used verbiage like acceptable risk.
•:. NASA obviously wanted low cost, low risk; science no longer a primary driver.
Evaluation Criteria
o:. Science value should be increased above 25%.
•:. Vol. II and Vol. m proposal scores should be developed independently if similar approach
is used in future.
• The technical, cost, and management evaluation team helped to determine both Vol. II
and Vol. III scores!!
NASA-5 (2-IPAs) SAIC I IDPEP I of me I Subpanel Technology
Other Governrnent-3 14 [ 10 I Air Force ] Engineers Education
Universities- 12 Reviewers [ Reviewers [ [ Space Systems I 3 NASA Reviewers Public Awareness
Foreign-6 _ I 13 Reviewers [ 1 Navy Reviewer SB/SDB
V
-..q .,o° So  ionl/
_ Consensus on all Criteria _
I
Executive Committee
Final Numerical Score
I
Space Science
Steering Committee
Independent Review
I
[SELECTION I
Science vs. Cost
•:. Concept of"highest science per unit cost" fundamentally flawed. Drives community to
"lowest common denominator" science.
•:. Cost should not be the overriding factor for mission selection.
• Establish whether program is within cost cap and then ignore costs as a selection
criterion.
o:. Science should override all other factors if costs are within caps.
°:. Establish classes within Discovery so as to not penalize aggressive missions.
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Program Management
o1- Cost models.
* Models used for evaluation should be given to all proposers.
* Cost data should have no page limit.
* Since models were used to determine cost, why was so much cost detail required?
.:. NASA may have established a new cost cap for Discovery by accepting a $59M program.
* If left unchanged, a void of science missions that exceed the $100M cap would
be created.
o:- NASA allowed too much visibility of the selection process---consequence was that other
criteria could not be factored into process.
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Summarized Written Community Comments
Mark Saunders, Discovery Program Manager, NASA Headquarters n
Community Response
•:. Written comments were limited:
• 2/3 of comments were submitted by Evaluation Panel membership
• 1/3 submitted by members of Discovery missions
•:. 2/3 substantial verbal comments during debriefings; not covered here
•:. 1/3 comments came in four varieties: compliments, criticisms, suggestions for improve-
ments, and questions
Compliments
•:. Discovery approach continues to be positive and AO implements Discovery
goals/approach
o:- Teaming approach with PI in charge is efficient and effective
o:- Shifting risk management to teams puts mission assurance where it belongs
Criticisms and Suggestions for Improvement
AO
•:° AO needs refinement to be more effective; too excessive for this stage
• Responses cost too much
•:- Conduct some form of two-step process that selects a small number of proposers from a
summary proposal; request additional info from selected group
•:- Mission cost should not be the overriding factor for mission selection; the best science
within the "cap" should override all other factors
•:- Page limits penalized aggressive missions since more information was required to
describe missions
Science
It appears that the central guiding principle of Discovery getting the most science for the
dollar was not utilized in the evaluation process
* A credible means of computing science per dollar is needed
-:° A minimum threshold for science, as well as other criteria, should be established
-:. The science evaluation should be based on the established Solar System Exploration
priorities
.:o Science criteria weight was too low; should have been at least 50%
-:o Some policy for extended missions is needed
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Technical Approach
•". Considering technical risk in both the technical approach and cost criteria is
double jeopardy
•:. Instruments should be considered as part of the technical approach
-:. New technology should not have been penalized in technical approach, since phases A and
B are there to deal with these issues
Opportunity
o:- SB/SDB participation, as well as other opportunities, may be too immature to include in
the AO
Management
°:o Organizational experience was not considered in the evaluation of proposals
Cost
o:. AO required costing detail, which is inconsistent with stage of definition
o:. Complete and accurate cost evaluation of 28 proposals was an impossible task
* Sufficient documentation typically takes thousands of pages
* Cost-estimating techniques are not sufficient discriminators
• Cost model used in evaluation is inaccurate and not suitable
-'- Exclusion of organizational cost performance was a fundamental flaw
°'- Setting a cost target, as the mid-point, as well as the cost cap might help
°:. Provide incentive/penalties to encourage accurate proposals
Questions
oZ.
°:°
How can more challenging scientific objectives be rewarded instead of penalized?
How should the 24 missions not selected consider their chances in the next round?
* Some feedback from NASA would be helpful
o:. How does Discovery relate to other NASA programs, e.g., New Millennium, PIDDP, etc.?
o:. How does new instrument development play?
-:. Should cost even be a criterion?
-:. A number of questions were asked about the evaluation process and results
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Mark Saunders, Discovery Program Manager, NASA Headquarters B
General
.Zo
.:.
AO, evaluation methodology, and evaluation process worked, but can be improved
Resource investments by both proposers and evaluators were extensive
* Some other process needs to be explored to reduce investments
Execution of contracts was quick, but can be improved by requiring statement of work as
part of proposal
In current environment, there are some program constraints that are nonnegotiable
* Method that allows big and small missions to compete against each other is required
* Assuring adequate cost estimating protects both NASA and proposers
AO
•". Despite statements in AO and repeated attempts to advise community about importance of
low cost, some never appreciated its significance
•:. Five evaluation criteria worked well, but could be assembled differently:
• Science and Return on Investment (ROI)
• Probability of achieving scientific objectives
• Technical Approach
• Management Approach
• Experience
• Likelihood of making it within cost and schedule
• Other factors, e.g., opportunity
•:- Identifying weights of criteria would have helped proposers
•:. Providing funding profile would have helped proposers
•:- Since we plan to release AOs every 18-24 months, we should limit launch window or
provide 2 flight opportunities with specific windows for each
Evaluation Methodology
Science
o1.
oZo
Prioritizing intrinsic merit of various targets/objectives would have helped both sides
Simple evaluation method for science, when combined with other criteria, may not have
completely represented spectrum of science quality
Mail reviews would have been nice but would have lengthened process
Having cost weighed slightly more than science achieved our goal of making small, mod-
est science missions competitive with more expensive/extensive science missions, but there
may be better algorithm for science ROI
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Technical Approach
•:o Assessment of risk is valid, and is necessary constituent of technical approach
• May be better way of balancing risk vs. technology infusion and scientific scope
• Dependent on overall acquisition strategy that may differ from AO to AO
•:o Some info was more important than others; would help to reduce data to that which is
most important
Opportunity
•:. Too much may have been expected at this stage in areas of technology transfer, education,
public affairs, and small/small-disadvantaged businesses
•:. Most important is degree of commitment to each in terms of organizational and
financial resources
•:. Technology infusion might have more emphasis in future solicitations
Management
o:. Worked well, but certain areas could be adjusted to help proposers, e.g.:
* Considering key position qualifications as well as key personnel experience
-:. Some info was more important than others; would help to reduce data to that which is
most important
Cost
o:. Absolutely most difficult area to evaluate; struggled with both techniques and consistency
with program objectives
o:. Conducted multitude of sensitivity analyses to confirm conclusions
o:. Despite assertions to contrary, cost analysis techniques used did not skew conclusions
o:. Another way to assess cost that assures fairness to all proposers and NASA is welcome
• "Trust Me" (not assessing cost) will not serve either side well
Evaluation Process
Diverse science and technical teams provided sufficient viewpoints to assure fairness across all
proposals and consideration of new ways of doing business
Executive committee participation from start to end was beneficial and reduced overall labor and time
Revising evaluation flow and better allocating resources would improve evaluation process
A two-step process, similar to MIDEX AO, is possible while still achieving Discovery objectives
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Two-step Process -- one option
Step #1:
1.
o
Submit first half of proposal, which encompasses science proposal including mission
design; include one-page summary of proposed cost; include basic management organiza-
tion and team membership
Evaluate science and ROI; select subset to proceed to step #2
Step #2:
1.
o
Submit second half of proposal, which includes technical approach; management and cost
sections plus any changes to science
Evaluate step #2 proposals based on three criteria previously described: (1) Science and
ROI; (2) Probability of achieving scientific objectives; (3) Other factors (Opportunity)
Note: Other factors (Opportunity) could be included in either step depending on emphasis
Timeline: Step #1 proposal preparation
Step #1 proposal evaluation
Step #2 proposal preparation
Step #2 proposal evaluation and selection
3 months
2 months
2 months
3 months
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Splinter Group Sessions
Science and Return on Investment (ROI)
W. V. Boynton
Return on Investment should be determined by the following formula:
ROI -- 0.8 x Sci x SciRisk + 0.1 × Ed + 0.1 x PA
Science Value (Sci)
Science value is to be determined primarily by how well the proposed science objectives address the
priorities determined by the strategy of the National Research Council (NRC) Committee
on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) and NASA's strategic plans. The score
should reflect the breadth of the proposed investigation (how many objectives are ad-
dressed), the depth of the investigation (how thoroughly the objectives are addressed), the
importance of the investigation (the priority of the objectives that are addressed), and the
quality to which the objectives are addressed (the extent to which the proposed measure-
ments are sufficient to address the objectives).
Another more subjective factor to include is the anticipated impact that the investigation will have on
the field. It is suggested that the value for this factor be put on a linear scale with a high-
quality mission (such as Voyager or Apollo) being ten and a modest mission (such as
Clementine) being one. This is not a scale from one to ten; missions could have values
greater than ten or less than one.
In order to use these scores in the algorithm, it will need to be normalized to unity. This can be
accomplished by dividing all scores by the score of the highest ranked mission.
The way cost should be entered into the equation was still up for debate. It was felt the best way was
to have several (~3) bins of comparable cost, and once a mission was in a particular bin,
cost would no longer be a discriminator against other missions in the same cost bin.
Ed and PA are Educational Program Activities and Public Awareness
Science Risk (SciRisk)
This term should be expressed as something that approximates a probability (from zero to one). It is
determined primarily from instrumentation and the quality of the science team.
It was felt that Technology Infusion should not be given a separate score. The rationale for this is that
the use of the new technology should already manifest itself by increasing the science or
reducing the risk and would thus get into the score with an appropriate weight.
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The final score should be a combination of ROI and Risk.
Score -- ROI x Risk
Risk -- Management Risk x CostRisk x Approach Risk
Like science risk, these three terms should be expressed on a scale from zero to one and should be in
the form of a probability. These terms will describe the probability that the area will cause
the anticipated Return on Investment not to be achieved.
The question of targeting the AO to a specific area was considered. The consensus was that if NASA
determines in advance that there are reasons to do so, they should so state the areas of
emphasis in the AO, but that the emphasis should not be exclusionary. The ability of the
selection officer to exercise discretion when a clear case could be made was thought to be
able to deal with most situations.
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Technology vs. Risk: Mission Success and Other Factors
m D. Roalstad
The thrust of this splinter session was to identify those technology vs. risk issues as they relate to
mission success and other factors. First we had to define what constitutes mission success
and the other factor elements. These elements include technology transfer, technology
infusion, SB/SDB infusion, education, and public awareness.
A process established for the session was to list all technology vs. risk issues relating to mission
success and other factors we could think of. Reviewing these issues with at least a subjec-
tive assessment of priorities, we developed a preliminary set of recommendations. These
issues and recommendations were then presented in a plenary session to the fall workshop.
An attempt has been made in this report to capture the comments received, but I'm sure
more thoughts will be generated in the months ahead.
Following are charts summarizing the session results:
DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE
Mission Success is determined by accomplishing the floor science defined by the proposing PI.
Floor Science is defined as the minimal science the PI is willing to fly.
OTHER FACTORS
•:. Technology Transfer
•:oTechnology Infusion
o:.SB/SDB Requirements
•:- Education
•:- Public Awareness
ISSUES
•:o Take risk but don't fail perception is a conflict.
•"- Technology demonstration before science mission-- is that necessary?
•:- How much should science missions push the technology envelope?
•:o What reliability level is adequate for mission sources?
•:o How is science downgrade vs. risk treated?
•:o Go/No Go vs. 2% weighting factor on other factors.
o:. Other factors -- goal vs. objective.
•:° Reasonable levels for other factors.
•:. Acceptable launch risk level.
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ISSUES DISCUSSION
There is a perception that the agency cannot accept any failure that is in conflict with
statements to accept higher risk levels. This environment results in a gap between
proposers and reviewers on what is acceptable--very subjective at best.
There is a growing concern that technology must be demonstrated (e.g., New Millennium)
before use on a science mission. Science by its very nature tends to utilize new technology
that is unique to the PI's science, which has been under development in university labora-
tories. Technology output has been one of the best added-value products of science
missions.
o:. Reasonable reliability levels of parts subsystems and systems can be prescribed and
achieved for science programs to mitigate risk.
Science objectives can be reduced from the desired level to the floor with a logical plan
should risk assessments dictate. The PI now has responsibility and authority to manage
with finn guidelines.
The AO implies that there is a 2% (approximately) weighting factor applied to other
factors, yet the perception is that a Go/No Go criterion is applied to the proposal evalua-
tion.
o:. Other factors are currently defined as objectives for the proposers with excessive levels.
Would goals be more appropriate with reasonable levels?
o:. Launch risk levels are as important to the mission as is the space segment hardware--what
is acceptable?
RECOMMENDATIONS
Mission success should be defined as accomplishing the floor science established by the
PI. The PI will propose science levels for accomplishment that are in excess of the mini-
mum below which he would not fly. Therefore, the "floor" level of science is the minimal
level of science the PI believes to be scientifically justifiable for flight. Should he not be
able to achieve this level of performance within other program guidelines, he would
terminate the program.
Discovery Mission should be science driven, not technology driven. However, new tech-
nology is generally essential to the science objectives proposed. New technologies pro-
posed should be identified and a development plan provided that will bring these technolo-
gies to level 6 by phase C/D start and level 8 by launch. (Ref. NASA Code R document
for technology development state.) Launch services should demonstrate these same levels.
•:o Other factor elements are generally a result of social-political mandates on the program
and can be managed. The consensus, however, was that the SB/SDB levels of 8%/8% for
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a total of 16% of program value is excessive and that all other factors should be estab-
lished as goals rather than firm objectives. All functions, as currently mandated, can be
accomplished at added expense to the program and could detract from the primary science
focus. For maximum efficiency on achieving lowest cost we want high focus and the
shortest possible schedule.
Cost growth is the risk element in having to perform other factors where minimal experi-
ence exists for levels that are significantly above those previously experienced. For one-of-
a-kind types of missions, the technology problems are most difficult to manage, requiring
highly focused team attention. Forcing work into the SB/SDB adds to subcontracts
management and communication burden as a schedule and cost risk.
The bottom line from our session was that other factors could be managed as is with some
cost and schedule risk to the program. The preference was to recommend goals rather
than objectives and to reduce SB/SDB requirements to more reasonable levels; 8-10%
total. Perhaps a more efficient process can be established that doesn't place an abnormal
burden on the science team that is desperately trying to maintain focus.
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Cost
n G. S. Hubbard
Note on Models
Models useful for sensitivity and risk analysis for:
•:. a given mission
•:. by a given team
o:. a specific management plan
•:. similar system requirements
When making comparisons between different proposals the modeler is forced to make many
subjective estimates.
Note on Cost Proposal Instructions
The devil is in the details -- small changes in wording can greatly change the amount of work
required with little added value.
Suggested weighting:
Step One Step Two
Science 70 20
Technical 20 25
Management 10 25
Cost Risk 0 30
Opportunity N/S N/S
Cost Categorized Not Scored
Step Two Evaluation
o:. Evaluation criteria-- science, technical, management, cost risk (absolute cost is not
scored)
-:. All proposal evaluated together WRT same criteria
°:. Evaluate cost risk by analysis of proposal data (do not evaluate on basis of probable cost
models)
°:- Questions and orals are a required part of the process to ensure complete understanding
of the cost risk
-:. Rank proposals and submit to source selection authority (SSA)
SSA has ranked list with cost for each.
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Suggested Two-Step Process
Step One
o:.
Open solicitationmpurpose to narrow field
Limits on mission cost, launch date, other program ground rules
Primarily evaluated on value of science WRT published NASA goals
Proposals grouped in 3 or 4 cost bins
Best 2 or 3 proposals in each bin selected for step 2
Cost proposal consists of total mission cost estimate at second level WBS spread by year
and assumptions and rationale to support of basis of estimate
Step Two
o:.
o:.
Evaluation weighted differently than step 1
Cost proposal consists of detailed phase A cost estimate and priced options for phases B,
C/D, E
Priced options consist of SOW, WBS to level 3 (subsystem), summary BOEs at level 3,
time phased by year, manpower spread, and no 1411
Goals
•:. Reduce LCC of the AO
•:. Expand science opportunity by reducing cost of entry
o:. Provide equal opportunity for missions of different size
•:. Provide alternative to should cost models for evaluation
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AO/AO Process Changes and Program Management
m L. Mitchler
AO/AO Process/Program Management
•:. 14 attendees (broad representation)
•:. Defined charter
•:. Identified 21 issues
•:. Synthesized to 7 problems
• What problem will we solve?
•:o Top problems discussed
• Life cycle cost of AO
• Science in the hands of scientists
• AO clarity
• Big and small missions
-:. "Solutions" discussion begun
Problems/Recommendations
1. How to reduce "life cycle cost of AO"?
All resources (t & $) and still get best proposals.
2. How to clearly communicate the intent of AO?
Requirements
Evaluation/scoring/criteria (RFP vs. AO)
Including support services (DSN)
3. Ensure AO reflects complex strategy and connect to other programs.
4. Ensure science/ROI expressed in next AO
5. Selection IPDT--e.g., DSN assets common loop
6. Should NASA revisit cap on "contributed costs"?
Commercial
International
United States
7. Upfront IA spending to minimize later problems
Meet funding profile
Guideline available funds
Problem: Big Mission vs. Small Missions
Should there be different AO categories?
Assumption: There are different and inherent complexity and cost missions.
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Proposed Solutions:
1. NASA state maximum cost to be spent on given AO defined/constant boundary conditions
well before AO.
2. Separate cost category AOs.
o:- Adapt to changing environment
• Mercury
• Lander
• Rendez
• Lunar
• NEO
•:- Big vs. small missions
°:. During selection process
•:- Cost/risk
o:- Cost/science ROI
Problem: Life cycle cost of AO/Science in hands of science
Proposed Solutions:
1. Science validation.
Compulsory
I-U + concern cat
Pub results and definitions
Not a screening
Pros:
Cons:
Science/Science
Early Validation
Doesn't Screen
Bidding War
Postpones Teams
Doesn't Screen
Process Solutions
1. No substantive change/constant criteria two step
2. Science validation
3. Two-step downselect
Pros:
Cons:
Reduces full proposal cost
Get best science
Too long?
Encourages buy in?
Decouples from cost?
Still require some study investment
•.'- AO only
•:- Based on firm science floor
•:. NTE cost
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Summary
._.
._.
.:.
More time required for definitive recommendation.
Whatever we do should maintain cognizance of cost-constrained environment.
Watch the Midex experiment.
DISCOVERY LESSONS LEARNED
Discovery Philosophy
o:. Keep "Faster, Better, Cheaper" Theme
•:. Keep average cost/mission < $80M
•:. Keep mission plans simple
•:. Keep payload < 3-4 instruments
o:. Let other Code S programs do more costly missions
o:. Do not have 2 or 3 cost classes
Announcement of Opportunity
o:. Delete repetition
o:. De-emphasize "Opportunity" let us do our jobs without being "politically correct"
o:. Do not expect so much for a Phase A study
o:. Do not expect "ROM costs" to be "not to exceed"
°:. Do not change rules, i.e., ROM + 15% became ROM
Evaluation
•:. Was "fair and equitable"
•:. Leave it as is
-:. Do it on time
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